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LOW STAKES AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Adam M. Samaha* 
Many of us engage in debates, sometimes intense debates, over the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation for judges.  This paper offers six reasons 
to believe that these debates involve low stakes, in the sense that the choice 
among competing methods will not determine outcomes in a significant number 
of important cases.  These reasons involve mainstream constraints, overlapping 
results, indeterminate results, intolerable results, interpretation without decision, 
and unimportant constitutional decisions.  After a suitably brief investigation of 
theoretical and experimental resources on low-stakes decision making, the paper 
suggests how debates over constitutional interpretation by judges might proceed 
if more people become convinced that the stakes are indeed low.  Three venues of 
debate are considered—academia, the judicial appointments process, and 
judiciaries—along with stakes beyond case outcomes. 
The revolution will not be litigated, just as it will not be televised, and everyone 
should know that by now.1  Decades of studies indicate that judges usually work at the 
margins of social life.  When court decisions do implicate key policy choices, they are 
constrained by forces beyond the control of judges.  Internal and external constraints 
ensure that judicial behavior cannot be explained by any straightforward notion of what 
individual judges prefer as a matter of policy, whether or not they enjoy tenure and salary 
protection.  Courts are part of a larger if developing settlement that allows judicial power 
in only a fraction of all significant social decisions.  So, earlier this year, the Supreme 
Court did step in to liberate corporate and union treasuries from a part of campaign 
finance regulation.2  But last year the Court had nothing to say about the Chrysler bailout 
and bankruptcy,3 years have passed without the Court ordering anyone released from 
                                                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.  This essay was drafted for a 
symposium on Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People (2009), hosted by the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law and the National Constitution Center on January 29 and 30, 2010.  I thank 
the symposium participants, workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School, and Matthew 
Adler, Omri Ben-Shahar, Rosalind Dixon, Tom Ginsburg, Todd Henderson, Aziz Huq, Sanford Levinson, 
Martha Nussbaum, Matthew Stephenson, and David Strauss for their comments.  Hanna Chung provided 
excellent research assistance.  Mistakes are mine—although probably unimportant. 
1 See Gil Scott-Heron, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, on PIECES OF A MAN (Flying 
Dutchman Productions 1971).  Actually, the revolution might be televised if “television” survives beyond 
this generation.  I put that question aside. 
2 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (addressing 
independent expenditures on mass communications).  Lobbying expenditures were never so restricted, the 
Court upheld the disclosure requirements at issue, and it is not yet clear how excited corporate managers 
will be to use treasury funds on advertising that takes sides in contested candidate elections.  Still, Citizens 
United is evidence that the Court sometimes issues significant decisions at odds with mainstream public 
opinion, perhaps even public opposition that was predictable before the fact.  A useful area of research 
involves how the Court chooses (narrow) fields in which to march against strong head winds.  But my 
focus here is more about how often this might happen and associated issues. 
3 See Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009) (per curiam) 
(refusing to stay the bankruptcy court’s orders permitting asset sales).  The Court did tell other judges to be 
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Guantánamo Bay,4 and no one expects the Court to do much notable work regarding a 
climate change treaty, tax policy, budget deficits, and so forth. 
If confidence in these observations is greater today than in earlier generations, the 
basic point is nevertheless not new.  Shortly before the Supreme Court bowed to the 
essential components of the New Deal, Dean Alfange presciently wrote that the Court 
“has, with but few exceptions, adjusted itself in the long run to the dominant currents of 
public sentiment.”5  True, there remains much to discover about the determinants of 
judicial behavior.  Courts adjust themselves to only a subset of all social, economic, and 
political forces, and case outcomes are far from perfectly predictable.  A fairly accurate 
model of judicial behavior might not last more than a generation.  Things change.  But 
the last seventy years of scholarship on judicial behavior has been, to a significant degree, 
an extended confirmation of insights like Alfange’s. 
These results ought to raise questions about a longstanding debate:  the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation for judges.6  If more people become convinced 
that the judicial choice of interpretive method for constitutional issues is actually a low 
stakes decision—in the sense that the choice will not determine outcomes in a significant 
number of important cases—then what will debates over this choice look like?  What 
should they look like?  Should they take place at all? 
The first part of this essay collects reasons to believe that this interpretive choice 
is indeed a matter of low stakes for society.  A few of these reasons draw from doubts 
about the efficacy of judiciaries, or of judicial review, or even of constitutional law writ 
large.  But the conclusion about the stakes for constitutional interpretive choice by judges 
does not depend on these broader doubts.  The stakes are probably low regardless; larger-
scale doubts impose yet another potential ceiling on those stakes.  The second part 
suggests ways in which the contemporary debate over constitutional interpretation by 
judges might and should be affected by the perceived stakes.  This includes a brief 
discussion of theory and experimental evidence regarding the effect of stake size on 
behavior before moving on to debates over interpretive method.  Of course inquiries into 
constitutional interpretation occur in many venues with many different participants.  I 
will therefore comment on how the stakes vary across these contexts, and why the 
                                                                                                                                                 
more quiet about the matter, see Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2009) 
(vacating the court of appeals’ affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s orders and instructing that the appeal 
be dismissed as moot), and that announcement might be telling. 
4 Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (continuing to maintain federal 
habeas jurisdiction over detainees), with Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam) 
(remanding a case involving the authority of federal courts to order the release of detainees). 
5 DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 40 (1937).  Alfange’s epilogue 
comments on the then recently decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.  See id. at 237–39. 
6 Here I use the term “interpretation” broadly to include prominent competing methods for judges 
to gain meaning from legal texts and to make constitutional decisions.  See generally Kent Greenawalt, 
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 268–70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds. 2002).  These methods include 
conventional contemporary understanding, moral readings, and originalist interpretations of text, as well as 
common-law constitutionalism, minimalism, Thayerian deference, and representation reinforcement.  There 
are narrower definitions of “interpretation,” of course, and I often find them useful.  But they would lower 
the stakes of debates over “interpretive method” even further.  See infra text accompanying notes 28–34. 
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outcomes in litigated cases are not the only stakes involved. 
Before going forward, two points of clarification are in order.  First, this essay 
concerns a debate happening in a particular time and place, though the debate does spill 
across several smaller subcontexts.  I will speak to the contemporary debate regarding 
judges in the United States without pretending to offer advice for other systems.  Second, 
assessing the stakes of a decision depends on values.  Although I hope that my analysis is 
largely insensitive to value commitments, it cannot be fully independent of those 
commitments.  Interpretive choices might allow some people to act with integrity or to 
achieve progress toward some truth as best they can understand it, even if those choices 
are not important in another way.  My interest is in the social impact of court decisions, 
which is a concern shared by many.  But “the stakes” are partly a function of who makes 
the assessment, and I do not mean to offer a universal answer to the stakes question. 
I.  LOW STAKES FOR INTERPRETIVE CHOICE 
Not a few critics have suggested that courts are taking over our lives in the name 
of the Constitution.7  This kind of complaint is normal.  Any meaningful judicial role in 
supreme law will prompt intense objection from at least some observers.  Someone is 
bound to complain whenever a judge privileges certain supposedly fundamental rights, or 
certain minority interests, or certain forms of reasoning, or certain forms of democracy, 
or ancient values, or elite values, or politically countercyclical values, or the last 
generation’s values, or whatever.  There are many functions that our courts can and have 
served over the years as part of a shifting arrangement of societal forces, and each of 
those functions has a victim of sorts. 
The strong-form complaints are easily exaggerated, however.  An extravagant 
claim of judicial dictatorship might be nothing more than manufactured outrage linked to 
a few easily consumed judicial decisions with an otherwise selective and passing 
influence on the world.  Whether or not strategically expressed indignation is part of the 
picture, there are reasons to believe that judicial decisions rarely make serious differences 
in the course of social life; and that judges cannot resolve all of their constitutional cases, 
let alone rise above sideshow status, by choosing one of the competing methods for 
interpreting the Constitution over another.  The social significance of constitutional 
decisions in the courts might well be modest in most instances, and the significance of 
interpretive method within those decisions is certainly more modest still.  These 
observations would remain true, moreover, even if one of us could snap our fingers and 
have every judge agree to make level-best efforts to abide by a single method of 
constitutional interpretation. 
A.  Six Reasons 
(1) Mainstream constraint.  One way or another, judicial decisions usually end up 
within the mainstream of thought prevailing outside the courthouse.  Observers from 
Robert Dahl and Robert McCloskey through Gerald Rosenberg and Barry Friedman have 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 I hesitate to place these books together, but the general message of warning can be found in CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 1–17 
(2006), and MARK REED LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 9–13 
(2005).  Levin portrays the threat of judicial tyranny as having come to pass. 
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indicated that judges are more conformists than radicals,8 the leading illustration being 
the Supreme Court’s flagging resistance to New Deal innovation.  High-profile 
capitulation should not lead us to overstate the point.  Certainly there have been stretches 
of politically countercyclical judging for some set of issues9—by some standards we are 
experiencing a countercyclical spell right now.10  But these episodes are usually like an 
earlier brand of economic recession:  short and shallow.  There seem to be no examples 
of the Court using supreme law to oppose any central element of a governing coalition’s 
program for an extended period of time, and certainly not when sources of conventional 
legal argument (including judicial precedent) plainly pointed the other way.  Not even 
Dred Scott broke this pattern.  And much of the Warren Court’s constitutional work 
policed local or regional outlier policies without contradicting anything approaching a 
national consensus.11 
It is difficult to specify precisely why the pattern of court decisions suggests a 
mainstream constraint and precisely when that constraint can be overcome,12 but judicial 
moderation is consistent with an ineradicably political appointments process.  Even if the 
simple policy preferences of judges explain their decisions, as unreconstructed 
attitudinalists suggest,13 the range of judicial preferences is shaped by the appointments 
process beforehand.  Most state judges are elected, and neither ACORN nor Tea Party 
membership is an established credential for a federal judgeship.  Within the federal 
appointments process, any number of past decisions must be taken as settled by nominees 
hoping for confirmation.  The current list includes not only Brown but also Griswold and, 
not at all ironically, Marbury.  In addition, at least some judges think strategically and 
hope to maintain respect for their judgments.14  Were federal courts to depart from their 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 367–76 (2009); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE 428–29 (2d ed. 2008); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 
(1960); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 501 (2006) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court tends, in the long run, to cooperate with the vector sum of forces in national politics.”). 
9 Perhaps the best example is the Court’s opposition to prayer in public schools that is orchestrated 
by government officials.  See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  For opinion 
polling on the question, see Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008). 
10 I am writing in advance of the 2010 elections. 
11 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 34–37, 376, 379–
80, 396, 489–94 (2000) (discussing Brown, Griswold, Gideon, and Miranda, and identifying a Southern 
value set as a principle loser from judicial review in the 1960s). 
12 Among the possible explanations for effective exercises of judicial power despite majority 
opposition, aside from issues on which no real majority coalesces, are:  low-intensity opposition from a 
popular majority; high-intensity support from an elite minority; holdovers in the judiciary from a prior 
governing coalition who retain some power as part of a new settlement; and competing coalitions 
attempting to delegate certain issues to the courts to lower the stakes of politics when rotation in office is 
foreseen.  On the latter two possibilities and their limits, see Mark Tushnet, Political Power and Judicial 
Power: Some Observations on Their Relation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 755 (2006). 
13 See JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (2002). 
14 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
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relatively mainstream tradition, they might suffer reprisals or disregard, as they 
sometimes have in the past.15  In view of this reality, judges probably will adopt 
interpretive methods most likely to produce results that are compatible with a mainstream 
boundary.  To the extent that judges are a product of, confined to, and unable to influence 
mainstream opinion, their choice of interpretive method is quite inconsequential.  
Capping the range of results simultaneously caps the stakes of choosing a method to 
reach those results. 
Now, if the Roberts Court announces that the federal government cannot impose a 
tax on individuals for failing to purchase health insurance,16 some observers might look 
past lasting public opposition to the legislation17 and reconsider the practical limits on 
judicial intervention.  But the Court’s recent track record is not even that bold.  
Invalidating flat handgun bans is no evidence of judicial radicalism in the United States.18  
And the Court’s decision to stand aside when the Chrysler bankruptcy plan was 
challenged is a sign that the post-1937 model remains in place.  Today the Roberts Court 
is the most “conservative” institution of the federal government.  As a tactical matter I 
would rather challenge the federal health care legislation there than seek repeal in 
Congress, for example.  Yet the Court’s politically countercyclical force to date can only 
be described as minimal.  The general point is that constraint is a nonissue for judges 
choosing interpretive methods for constitutional cases, certainly over the long haul.  
Judges are constrained regardless of interpretive method. 
Theoretically, judicial opinions might change nonjudicial opinions, and hence the 
correspondence between judicial views and mainstream views does not n will ecessarily 
mean that judges are constrained.  Similarly, policymakers might adjust to the anticipated 
objections of judges.  I see little evidence, however, that judicial decisions convert or 
deter many people on issues of significance to them.  Among other factors, persuasion 
depends on an audience that listens and is not otherwise convinced, and that stops 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note, at 12–13. 
16 A new tax penalty, exceptions, collection restrictions, and congressional findings are located in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, sec. 1501, 124 Stat. 242–49 (Mar. 23, 
2010).  The tax, assuming it is not repealed, will not take effect until 2014. 
17 A poll from the spring of 2010 showed support for the overall legislation at 32% and 
disapproval at 53%, most of it strong.  See CBS News Poll (Mar. 29–Apr. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/health.htm.  A more recent poll had the overall support figure at 40% and 
opposition at 56%.  See CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll (Aug. 6–10, 2010) (reporting 56% opposition to 
requiring people to have health insurance, but 58% support for requiring insurance companies to cover 
people with pre-existing conditions), available at http://www.pollingreport.com/health.htm. 
A federal district judge recently denied a motion to dismiss Virginia’s claim that the tax penalty is 
invalid.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, __ F.Supp.2d __ (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).  The absence 
of a mechanism for achieving something close to universal insurance combined with a mandate that 
insurers cover people with pre-existing conditions is essentially unsustainable.  So a Supreme Court 
holding against the tax penalty easily could prompt the unraveling of other central components of the 2010 
legislation.  This would indeed make for an important judicial decision, whether or not one prefers the 
result.  But the result would not necessarily buck public opinion or the preferences of political elites. 
18 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008); Philip J. Cook, Jens 
Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows From a Social Welfare 
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043, 1071–72 (2009) (discussing public and congressional 
opposition to handgun bans). 
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struggling when judgments are rendered.19  But even if judges can influence social life 
through persuasion or deterrence, doubt would persist that their choice of interpretive 
method makes a serious difference in those respects or in case outcomes. 
 (2) Overlapping results.  The results of different interpretive methods sometimes 
overlap.  Even if judges were unconstrained by any other forces, they would nevertheless 
reach the same conclusions regardless of interpretive method for some number of 
decisions.  Every plausible methodological candidate for judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution will spit out the conclusion that the President of the United States must be at 
least thirty-five years of age according to the Gregorian calendar.  To take a few 
examples, the conventional contemporary meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of 
the Constitution of the United States, as understood by lawyers and everyone else in this 
country who reads it, incorporates the Gregorian dating conventions; presumably all 
versions of originalist inquiry will discover that the dating conventions were no different 
in the late eighteenth century on the eastern seaboard; a common-law constitutionalist or 
Burkean traditionalist will have no interest in disrupting the wide and long-settled 
understanding of the age requirement for presidents; and although a contemporary moral 
reading of the Constitution conceivably can yield more creative outcomes, it is difficult to 
find anyone who will use that method to go that far.  Indeed, a rough test for the propriety 
of an interpretive method is that the method clearly yields the conventional result.  If a 
presidential candidate aged thirty four according to today’s interpretive and dating 
conventions were nevertheless declared elected in an otherwise lawful manner, one could 
doubt both the persistence of those conventions and the likelihood of judicial 
intervention. 
This aspect of the age requirement for presidents is one of countless points of 
constitutional law on which a practical consensus holds across competing interpretive 
methods.  They include a president with veto power over legislation, a bicameral federal 
legislature, two senators per state, congressional elections, a Supreme Court, state 
governments along with a federal government, and so on.  Plainly there are debatable 
questions lurking near the undisputed elements of our constitutional system.  But equally 
certain are the presence of rationally indisputable areas of constitutional law subject only 
to classroom play and similar intellectual frolic.  These matters are usually not litigated or 
otherwise publicly contested, of course, which obscures the amount of overlap among 
competing interpretive methods.  But obscurity is no reason to suppose that all of these 
consensus conclusions are unimportant to social life.  Nor is it a reason to ignore the 
belittling effect on disputes over how judges ought to interpret the Constitution when a 
quiet consensus persists in sprawling fields of constitutional law.  Much of constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 See Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, When the Supreme Court Decides, Does the Public Follow? 
2–3 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998597 (finding no effect or a small effect on public 
opinion from learning about the Court’s resistance to regulation of abortion, flagburning, and sodomy); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1830 (2005) (collecting 
studies finding little Court influence on public opinion).  But see Rosalee A. Clawson, Elizabeth R. Kegler 
& Eric N. Waltenburg, The Legitimacy-Conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme Court: An Experimental 
Design, 29 AM. POLITICS RES. 566, 571–72, 580–82 (2001) (testing experimental-subject opinion effects 
regarding affirmative action and phone rate regulation).  The justices’ influence on public opinion probably 
will not increase if they mouth disagreement with the President at the State of the Union Address, or absent 
themselves from the event altogether.  A more robust communications effort would have to be mounted. 
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law is settled, and much of it is not settled by litigation.20 
(3) Indeterminate results.  At least occasionally, more than one interpretive 
method will fail to identify a uniquely superior result and will leave open the same set of 
possibilities.  When this is true, the choice between these methods is irrelevant to the 
decision.  Notions such as the morally best interpretation, original intent or understanding 
or public meaning, respect for judicial precedent or nonjudicial tradition, and 
contemporary conventional meaning are fairly abstract concepts.  They are sufficiently 
flexible to permit debate over proper applications in many individual cases.  One does not 
have to be a crit to understand that indeterminacy is a phenomenon in legal interpretation.  
Some contemporary originalists acknowledge that constitutional “interpretation” will 
sometimes run out and constitutional “construction” can then begin.21  In fact, observers 
from many theoretical camps have portrayed adjudication as encompassing both a 
preferred decision procedure that can end in indeterminacy, along with a supplemental 
decision procedure that is deployed to break ties.22  Resort to such tiebreakers is no 
surprise within this setting.  The gray areas in which interpretive method cannot provide 
clear answers are more likely to arise in dispute-resolving institutions such as judiciaries, 
insofar as easy questions are less likely selected for litigation, less likely to survive 
settlement efforts, and less likely to be appealed.23 
Indeed there is cause to believe that such indeterminacy is now hardwired into the 
methodological options.  It seems that, to qualify as a candidate method for interpreting 
the Constitution, the protocol must be fairly abstract.  Obviously the method must 
provide some guidance to count as a method at all.  But lists of preferred outcomes for 
particular constitutional debates are not what real-world proponents of interpretive 
methods are offering.  Part of what it means to offer a method of interpretation is rising 
above (or maybe just moving alongside) basal struggles over questions of immediate 
concern, such as who may get married, who may be executed, who is entitled to 
economic resources, and so on.24   However informative, a mere list of outcomes is bound 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Accord NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 123, 251 (1994) (contending that courts 
can address only a small fraction of significant policy disputes). 
21 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 118–23 (2004); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 7 (1999). 
22 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921); H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135–36 (rev. ed. 1994); Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1729–32 (1988).  On this theme, see Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
23 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5, 17 (1984); Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1717, 1722–27 (1988) (discussing theoretical selection effects on appeals); cf. Richard E. Miller & Austin 
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC. REV. 525, 536–43 
(1981) (showing a winnowing process from grievance, to claim, to disputed claim, to the use of lawyers 
and courts).  Empirical challenges to the strongest selection-effect theories include Theodore Eisenberg, 
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 
(1990). 
24 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 606, 613 (2008) (“Constitutional debate may escalate from particular controversies to interpretive 
method and then to theories of authority without resolving disputes or speaking to live questions.”). 
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to be dismissed as improperly results-oriented or inadequately designed for new issues or 
some such.  I do not imagine that the outer limit on interpretive method is well marked or 
well reasoned.  But the convention of debate in this field indicates that proponents must 
draft alternatives that are widely applicable to many different problems without 
stipulating outcomes for all or most foreseeable disputes.  Particular results may be 
illustrative; and they may suggest integrity through flashy bullet-biting.  They may not 
constitute “the method” in its entirety.  Whatever the explanation for the tradition, it 
leaves the good-faith operator of each method with a degree of freedom that allows for 
overlapping results—and therefore lowers the stakes for the choice of method. 
(4) Intolerable results.  Interpreters will not always have the will to reach results 
that are dictated by their announced methods.  Certain interpretive conclusions will strike 
decision makers as intolerable, even though the interpretive method suggesting those 
conclusions appeared to be appropriate before the fact.  Resistance selected locations of 
to the logical implications of an interpretive method can be spun as a regrettable lack of 
principle—a disappointing weakness when the judge realizes that his method permits 
barbarity while his stomach does not.25  However, the reappraisal of method in light of 
results is also, for some, the mark of enlightened rationality.26  It is an occasion for 
revising the method rather than uncritically marching into outrageous results. 
Admirable or not, we should expect judges to jettison their interpretive methods 
when the results become shocking to them.  And we should have this expectation even if 
the political situation leaves them unconstrained to adopt or reject what the judge finds 
shocking.  Blanching at horrifying outcomes is not always a sign of bad faith, moreover, 
so we need not assume that judges cynically make public commitments to interpretive 
methods without real effort to follow those commitments behind the scenes.  Such false 
advertising might occur but it is not necessary for the intolerable-results phenomenon to 
push down the stakes of interpretive choice.  Furthermore, at least some forward-looking 
judges might take evasive action when presented with certain handcuffing interpretive 
methods.  They might avoid ex ante commitments to any interpretive method that could 
point toward suicide pacts and regime disintegration.  To date there appears to be little 
serious empirical investigation into the relationship between announced interpretive 
methods and voting patterns or case outcomes.27  Experienced observers should 
nevertheless be skeptical that interpretive methods consistently trump otherwise strongly 
preferred outcomes. 
(5) Interpretations without decisions.  Many candidate methods of interpretation 
are not complete methods of decision making.  Some proponents are careful to explain 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I cannot 
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of 
flogging.”). 
26 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 29–33 (Erin Kelly ed. 2001) (on 
reflective equilibrium). 
27 An exceptional effort in this area is Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at 
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 130–32 (2002) (finding that text- or intent-based arguments in 
party briefs generally do not predict justices’ voting behavior as well as proxies for judicial ideology).  One 
hurdle to concluding that interpretive methods affect outcomes is the fact that decision makers choose 
interpretive methods in the first place. 
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that their preferred interpretive methods are designed only to establish the meaning of 
legal texts and not to issue broader recommendations about, say, adjudication.28  Now, to 
the extent that a judge must rely on legal texts to make a decision, an interpretive method 
is basically unavoidable.  But we should not be confused into believing that any version 
of originalism, for example, or a moral reading of the Constitution comes packaged with 
a complete set of tools for processing litigated cases and issuing judgments therein.  
Understanding what a legal text means in the abstract is not enough to close cases in the 
particular.  Far more information and evaluation is required to perform that function.  
Other decision-making methods are necessary to identify which legal texts are 
authoritative, to assign weights to valid legal sources, to collect other information about 
the dispute, to apply legal norms to the dispute in question, and so on.  Narrowly defined, 
then, interpretation is not decision.29 
Not everyone’s definition of “interpretation” is so restrictive.  Common usage of 
the term includes, for instance, the application of legal norms to particular cases, the 
consideration of judicial precedent regarding meaning, and relevant moral or ethical 
considerations.30  Thus many participants in debates over constitutional interpretation by 
judges are indeed making suggestions about sound decision making, not simply assigning 
meaning to a disembodied legal text.  Advocates of judicial minimalism31 and Thayerian 
deference to legislatures,32 for example, are intensely interested in justifiable court 
decisions.  However persuasive, many of these suggestions are themselves incomplete.  
Minimalism instructs judges to take one small step without providing them a direction; 
Thayerian deference instructs judges to police only clear constitutional violations without 
providing a method for distinguishing clear from unclear violations.  Even common-law 
constitutionalism33 and eclectic pragmatism,34 which are more comprehensive methods or 
attitudes for judicial decision making, include important flexibilities.  The constitutional 
pragmatist must choose goals before she can “do what works” to achieve them, and a 
common-law constitutionalist must choose normative commitments if she will test 
tradition against contemporary reason.  In all of these cases, a residual gap exists between 
method and decision.  This decreases the significance of interpretive choice, and more so 
for the less ambitious theories of interpretation. 
(6) Inconsequential decisions.  There is then the more general problem of 
unimportance in constitutional cases.  A subset of judicial decisions regarding 
constitutional law is, as far as anyone can really tell, inconsequential.  This is not to say 
that judicial resolution is unneeded within this subset of issues, only that we cannot 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823–24 
(1997). 
29 See generally Samaha, supra note 24, at 633–34, 675–77 (discussing interpretation, information, 
and decision). 
30 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 268–70. 
31 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). 
32 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY ch. 8 (2006). 
33 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001); 
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
34 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). 
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ascertain with reasonable confidence which resolution is better, and regardless which 
plausible definition of “better” that we use.  Consider the Supreme Court’s declaration in 
INS v. Chadha35 that legislative vetoes from Congress are unconstitutional.36  Not only 
did this practice survive the Court’s judgment, but I can find no solid evidence that real-
world policy changed, let alone improved.37  We might say the same about larger scale 
design questions such as the choice between unicameralism and bicameralism, or 
presidential and parliamentary systems. 
Surely some constitutional choices matter.  Among the best known observations 
on this score is Amartya Sen’s regarding famine as a product of political failure.38  It also 
might be true that democracies outperform authoritarian regimes in spreading high-
quality calories to especially poor people.39  Food is important.  Yet all too often we do 
not know enough about institutional design, future states of the world, or the proper rank 
ordering of normative goals in a diverse and complex society to confidently predict or 
judge the effects of constitutional choices, including the special effect of judicial 
intervention.  Selection effects in litigation tend to exacerbate such uncertainty, to the 
extent that courts are working on arguably significant constitutional problems.40 
To a degree, this uncertainty is itself unimportant.  A kind of arbitrariness or 
randomness in decision making is acceptable in some decision situations, such as when 
people with similar interests attempt to solve coordination problems.  The precise default 
date for Congress’s annual initial meeting is a trivial question compared to the problems 
with not establishing any date at all.41  In this domain, however, choice of interpretive 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
36 See id. at 958–59. 
37 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTION DIALOGUES 225 (1988); cf. Jessica Korn, Improving the 
Policymaking Process by Protecting the Separation of Powers, 26 POLITY 677, 677–80, 687–96 (1994) 
(finding no clear change in policy or power regarding education, but claiming that Congress stabilized 
certain funding decisions, took responsibility for them, and initiated negotiated rulemaking). 
38 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 51–52, 178–88 (1999) (claiming that, at least 
since World War II, no famine has occurred in a multiparty democracy with elections and a free media); 
see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 228 (2000) (finding life expectancy 
is longer in democracies, across national per capita income bands); Thomas D. Zweifel & Patricio Navia, 
Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality, 11 J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2000, at 99 (asserting democracies 
have lower infant mortality rates at every level of per capita GDP).  But see Michael Ross, Is Democracy 
Good for the Poor?, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 860, 860, 863–68, 871–72 (2006) (finding, with more countries in 
the data set and some imputed values, that democracies spend more money on public services but 
democracy has “little or no effect on infant and child mortality”). 
39 See Lisa Blades & Mark A. Kayser, Counting Calories: Democracy and Distribution in the 
Developing World 11–12, 16–18, 26–27 (Aug. 28, 2009) (using food-production and export/import data 
and comparing countries at similar growth rates, although also finding that semi-democratic regimes 
perform as well as democracies in terms of estimated total average daily calorie consumption), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521472.  The authors recognize the imperfect nature of their proxy for food 
consumption. 
40 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
9, 49 (2006) (arguing that most Supreme Court cases deal with non-salient, even if sometimes influential, 
policies). 
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.  At least for those who want Congress to continue meeting.  
There might be reasonable disagreement on that question. 
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method is unimportant as well.  Any determinative method will do.  Judges’ choices of 
interpretive method can and often will be unimportant even if the given constitutional 
question is crucial, but an unimportant constitutional question certainly makes for an 
unimportant interpretive choice. 
Finally, all of the above analysis was conducted as if all judges would adopt the 
same interpretive method for all constitutional cases.  This assumption inflates the stakes 
of methodological debate compared to a situation in which methodological diversity will 
persist and the mix of methods can only change modestly in the short run.42  The latter 
situation is the real world.  Judges do not appear willing to even attempt to impose a 
singular and meaningfully constraining interpretive method for constitutional cases.  Nor 
is some other institution in a position to do so.  Asking politely is not likely to have much 
impact.43  Judges will continue to exhibit differences in interpretive method for the 
foreseeable future. 
B.  Low Stakes, Not No Stakes 
The foregoing reasons to minimize the significance of constitutional interpretive 
method in the courts suggest that people of all ideological persuasions ought to have 
relatively little fear—or hope—when it comes to judicial review.  Judges might attempt 
to desegregate some public schools, but they will not chase Caucasian students across all 
borders.  Judges might retain jurisdiction over Guantánamo Bay, but they will not order 
the immediate release of all detainees.  Judges are eliminating the handful of existing 
local handgun bans,44 but they will not liberate people they do not trust to possess 
weapons that are not normal.45  Judges might use supreme and non-supreme law to 
protect businesses from certain legal claims,46 but they will not seriously interfere with 
the administration’s efforts to revive the economic system.  Bailouts, stimulus packages, 
paper money, and the Federal Reserve Board are safe. 
On the other hand, this interpretive choice is a low stakes decision, not a zero 
stakes decision.  External and internal constraints leave some area for judicial discretion.  
                                                                                                                                                 
42 This increased-stakes effect of aggregating judicial choices is true not only in Left/Right 
ideological terms, but also in terms of decision costs.  Some interpretive methods (e.g., crude textualism 
with crude tiebreakers for close cases) might be substantially cheaper to operate than other methods (e.g., 
purpose-driven inquiries supplemented by legislative history and predicted consequences), even with the 
selection effects of litigation. 
43 See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998) 
(observing that “judges, with only a few exceptions, are put off by [normative] constitutional theory” 
propounded by academics). 
44 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (declaring invalid the 
District’s prohibition on handgun possession in the home); McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3026 
(2010) (plurality opinion) (holding that Second Amendment rights, whatever they are, are enforceable 
against state and local action through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
45 See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816–17 (gratuitously providing a non-exhaustive list of presumptively 
valid firearms regulations). 
46 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (involving preemption); Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (involving pleading rules); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (involving punitive damages); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525 (2001) (involving commercial advertising); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999) (involving expert testimony). 
Draft 8/29/2010  12 of 26
Different interpretive methods are sometimes outcome determinative and divergent.  The 
outcome will sometimes be of interest to people beyond parties to a lawsuit, and the 
interests of the parties themselves count for something.  Moreover, a judge cannot live 
without an interpretive method.  Legal texts are neither self-explanatory nor self-
enforcing.  They are inanimate.  Like anyone else, a judge needs a way to understand the 
meaning of relevant legal sources.  Correct (or more persuasive) answers are better than 
incorrect (or less persuasive) answers, even if error costs are low. 
Furthermore, concluding that the stakes are low arrives with complications.  
Among them is the decision to plug in some value set for determining what counts as 
important, as well as a way to compare the influence of interpretive method with other 
determinants of judicial decisions.  Cases such as Chadha might turn out to be 
unimportant to nearly everyone in retrospect, but we have to acknowledge persistent 
disagreement and idiosyncratic priorities within a diverse population.  For some people 
reaching the correct interpretation of a legal text might be their highest calling regardless 
of any other consequence.  As well, collecting likely influences on constitutional 
judgments does not by itself establish the insignificance of interpretive method.  The 
appointments process, the ideological composition of the judiciary, the threat of 
retaliation from other institutions, the inability of interpretive choice to dictate unique and 
differing results, the limited impact of some constitutional decisions, and other factors 
reviewed above do not eliminate the role of interpretive method.  Plus, any one of those 
factors seems less important when placed alongside many others.  There probably are 
more precise ways to measure the relative significance of interpretive choice.  The 
combination of arguments offered above, however, should be enough to establish, at a 
minimum, that it is reasonable to seriously doubt the importance of interpretive choice in 
driving outcomes for a sizable number of constitutional cases important to social life. 
To be clear, this is not a recommendation that everyone discard constitutional 
litigation in general or methodological debate in particular.  Nonjudicial institutions are 
often ineffectual on their own, too.  Think about Congress and Iraq war policy, or traffic 
police and double parking.  The revolution probably will not happen at all.  But for more 
modest projects, constitutional litigation will sometimes be a party’s best hope.  And 
judges’ choice of interpretive method, which is influenced by outsiders through the 
appointments process if not elsewhere, can have at least modest effects on modest 
projects.  For these reasons, one side to a controversy should not automatically and 
unilaterally disarm themselves of the constitutional litigation option or of opportunities to 
influence the character of our judiciaries.  These efforts can be part of a formidable array 
of tactics taking place in multiple institutions, both public and private. 
Finally, judicial decisions and the choice of interpretive method for constitutional 
cases are important beyond the realm of particular results in court.  Judicial decisions can 
instigate broader discussions about the content of supreme law.  In addition, a judge’s 
chosen interpretive method can tell us something about how that judge perceives her role 
in society or, more narrowly, what she believes is a legitimate way to present that role.  
Significant for my purposes, selecting an interpretive method may identify oneself with a 
set of results that are favored or disfavored by large numbers of observers.  This has 
implications for the judicial appointments process and other public relations issues, a 
point to which I will return in the pages that follow. 
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So someone ought to keep thinking about interpretive method.  But the open 
questions include “who, how many, and how much?”  And the possible answers include 
“not me, not many, and not much.” 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISIONS AND DEBATES 
Below I offer thoughts on low stakes decisions and debates.  Apparently there is 
no canonical work on the subject, which might not be surprising given what one can say 
off the cuff about the significance of low stakes decision making.  Actually, a skeptic 
might think that the subject is too trivial to be worth the words written below.  But we 
face countless low stakes decisions throughout our lives.  A little guidance on how people 
do or should approach them all probably adds up to a worthwhile contribution.  And I 
promise that the discussion will remain concise and relatively superficial. 
A.  Low Stakes, Generally Speaking 
(1) Lower decision costs expended, higher error rates tolerated.  The armchair 
logic of decision costs is a good place to begin.  Decision making is itself costly, even 
when the decision is correct without doubt.  This is self-evident from everyone’s 
experience with group decisions.  A sound architecture for rational decision making will 
take into account decision costs (and benefits) along with error costs (and correctness 
benefits).  Because decisions always come with decision costs, decision makers have 
reason to be frugal in designing their decision procedures despite a higher risk of error.47 
These are obvious points but they indicate a basic lesson for identifiably low 
stakes decisions.  If the range of possible outcomes from a decision is narrow and 
includes only insignificant results—ranging from mildly pleasant to a little annoying—
then the decision maker can afford to be relatively less careful, even careless, in reaching 
a conclusion.  There is no sense in throwing research, thought, discussion, and other 
resources into a decision that will not make much difference to anyone anyway.  We 
should expect rational people to reduce decision costs and the degree of care taken when 
they perceive low stakes, and we might recommend that people behave in just this way.  
We should also expect more errors, somehow defined. 
Consistent with these expectations, some experiments show that performance-
based rewards incentivize participants to increase effort and accuracy.  For instance, paid 
subjects might observe more carefully and thereby enhance their ability to recall 
information.48  We can think of increasing financial incentives as increasing the stakes for 
good as opposed to poor performance.  It should be noted, however, that financial-
incentive effects are situation sensitive.  Incentives are sometimes ineffective and can 
backfire.49  Increased incentives might have no effect when participants are already 
intrinsically motivated to perform at a certain level, or when the task is so easy or so 
difficult that participant effort levels become sticky.  Worsening performance can result 
when participants become overly excited by the pressure of high stakes, or when they 
over-think decision problems.  In one study, subjects who were paid a little money to 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 See generally Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 604, 616 (2006). 
48 See Colin F. Camerer & Robin N. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incent0ives in Experiments: 
A Review of the Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8, 11 (1999). 
49 See id. at 8, 19–23, 34–36. 
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accurately predict which students would receive honors more often departed from a 
simple formula that was known to be correct 70% of the time.  Those subjects performed 
a bit worse than the formula would have.50 
(2) Higher settlement rates, when decision makers must interact.  A related 
prediction involves compromise.  We should expect more of it when people facing the 
same question must interact with each other and each perceive that not much turns on the 
answer.  In these situations, the participants can save each other the costs of additional 
debate by conceding certain points and splitting other differences.  This is a familiar 
thought from investigations into the selection effects of litigation.  Simple models of 
settlement indicate that settlement chances are higher when the costs of litigating increase 
relative to the stakes perceived by the parties, and that asymmetric stakes increase the 
chance of one party wanting to litigate rather than settle.51  Whether or not disputants 
usually follow these rationalist models of behavior, the idea is plainly attractive as a 
normative matter.  Relatively cheap capitulation can be better than expensive 
contestation. 
(3) Perhaps more frequent risk-taking and greater trust.  The next observation 
comes from a building set of experimental studies on the effect of stake size.  Testing 
external validity is often the motivation behind these experiments:  No-effect findings are 
a relief for many experimenters, whose other results may leave doubts that subjects take 
laboratory games seriously when the potential payoffs are measly.  Hypothetical or 
nominal payoffs are the most many experimenters can afford to offer.  But if stake size 
does not affect behavior, then cheap experiments might be adequate.  Regardless of the 
correct position on the external validity controversy, we are interested in evidence of how 
people behave relative to stake size. 
Some notable studies find that lower stakes are associated with lower levels of 
risk aversion, or at least greater variance in risk aversion levels.  In an early experiment, 
farmers in India were given money to play a series of lotteries run by the experimenters.52  
As the potential payouts increased, the least risk-averse contingents shrank.  For instance, 
more than 18% of the sample preferred an even-chances gamble of gaining either nothing 
or gaining 4 rupees over other even-chances gambles with less variance and higher low 
payouts; but that fraction fell to under 2% when the largest spread was instead either 
nothing or 200 rupees.53  A more contemporary study offered Georgia State students 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 See Hal R. Arkes, Robyn M. Dawes & Caryn Christensen, Factors Influencing the Use of a 
Decision Rule in a Probabilistic Task, 37 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 93, 107–08 
(1986); see also Robert H. Ashton, Pressure and Performance in Accounting Decision Settings, 28 J. 
ACCOUNTING RES. 148, 148–49, 157–61 (1990) (finding that incentives, feedback, and justification 
requirements led to lower average accuracy and higher variance in predicting Moody’s bond ratings when 
subjects competing against each other for prizes were given an optional formula). 
51 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 23, at 4–5. 
52 See Hans P. Binswanger, Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India, 62 
AM. J. AGR. ECON. 395, 396–400, 406 (1980). 
53 See id. at 399 tbl. 3 (showing fractions choosing the “Neutral to Negative” gamble for the first 
0.5 rupee game and for the 50 rupee game); id. at 396–97 & tbl. 1 (explaining the stakes and spreads); see 
also Steven J. Kachelmeier & Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High Monetary 
Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s Republic of China, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1120 (1992). 
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gambles for payouts ranging from pennies to over $300.  The experimenters came to 
similar conclusions.  The fraction of participants taking the relatively safe gambles (that 
is, gambles with higher floors and lower ceilings) increased as the potential payouts 
increased.54 
Other experiments study behavior in more social settings.  One recent effort 
associates lower stakes with higher levels of trust or willingness to cooperate.  Residents 
of rural Bangladesh were given various sums of money and the choice to send some part 
of it to a stranger-recipient; any amount sent would be tripled before it reached the 
recipient, and then the recipient was given the choice to send some part of that amount 
back to the sender.  Senders consistently sent positive amounts but they sent a larger 
fraction of the money when they were given less to send:  55% of the total was sent on 
average when the stakes were relatively low, compared to 46% when the stakes were 
medium and only 38% when high.55  We might say that the risk-taking findings are 
similar to the trust-elevating findings.  Both behaviors involve chance taking in a sense, 
and both might logically be related to low stakes.  Another explanation involves a desire 
for drama or avoidance of monotony.  Perhaps these phenomena help explain more 
erratic decision patterns when stakes are low.56 
To be clear, not every experiment concludes that stakes matter.  Several find no 
significant difference in player behavior when stakes are varied in certain types of 
dictator games, ultimatum games, and public goods games.57  At least in these settings, 
players are not appreciably changing their willingness to share surpluses or contribute to 
mutually beneficial projects when the maximum payoffs change.  Furthermore, we can 
imagine situations in which high stakes prompt the participants to pull together and 
collaborate in the best interests of all.  If each participant thinks of him or herself as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
1644, 1647, 1653–54 (2002) (finding increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion 
as real stakes rise, and stressing different results when subjects are presented merely hypothetical choices 
without actual money payoffs). 
55 See Olof Johansson-Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud & Peter Martinsson, Does Stake Size Matter in 
Trust Games?, 88 ECON. LETTERS 365, 367–68 & tbls. 1–2 (2005) (noting that amount sent also increases 
with income).  The highest sum given to senders was 4.8% of per capita GNI.  See id. at 366; see also 
Connel Fullenkamp, Rafael Tenorio & Robert Battalio, Assessing Individual Risk Attitudes Using Field 
Data from Lottery Games, 85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 218, 219, 224–26 (2003) (studying television game 
show contestant behavior and finding increasing risk aversion as stakes rise, but also that the most rational 
players are comparatively more likely to take large gambles). 
56 See Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 48, at 24. 
57 See, e.g., Martin G. Kocher, Peter Martinsson & Martine Visser, Does Stake Size Matter for 
Cooperation and Punishment?, 99 ECON. LETTERS 508, 510–11 (2007) (public goods games with South 
African high school students) (finding no significant effect of stakes on mean or variance in contributions); 
Jeffrey Carpenter, Eric Verhoogen & Stephen Burks, The Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments, 86 
ECON. LETTERS 393, 394–96 (2005) (ultimatum and dictator games with Middlebury College students) 
(finding no significant effect of stakes from $10 to $100 on average offers or allocations, although 
allocations fell as income rose and siblings increased).  But cf. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, What Do 
Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 
153, 164–65 (Spring 2007) (acknowledging mixed results for the theory that financial concerns will 
increase compared to morality concerns as stakes rise); Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High 
Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569 (1998) (finding a 
high-stakes effect emerging as players gained experience). 
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member of the same team, rather than strangers or competitors, we should expect higher 
levels of sharing, trust, and cooperation for their common good.58  Nevertheless, we can 
draw overall impressions from the experimental studies, and be on the lookout for riskier, 
more trusting, and perhaps more generous behavior when stakes are low, especially in 
otherwise competitive or adversarial settings. 
(4) Perhaps less capable participants, when people may select high or low stakes.  
A fourth and final observation will not be flattering to those who plan to continue writing 
about methods of constitutional interpretation, but there is logic behind it.  The idea is 
that high stakes games will attract relatively sophisticated, intelligent, and resourceful 
participants.  Low stakes games presumably will attract the opposite set.  It could be that 
participating in a high stakes interactive setting is known to be a costlier endeavor 
warranting greater investment in the decisions and greater amounts of insurance for bad 
outcomes.  To the extent that high stakes games are perceived as not only risky but also 
resource intensive, those with the resources will participate more often than others. 
On the other hand, the games that a person chooses to play might depend on her 
expectations about what everyone else will choose, and those expectations might not be 
easily predicted.  In addition, some people are overly confident or overly modest about 
their own abilities, and some people prefer the challenge of attempting to punch above 
their weight while others are happy to dominate lesser lights.  To the extent that playing a 
high-stakes game fosters a reputation for sophistication, moreover, even unsophisticated 
players might join for status, respect, or signaling purposes.  Hence there need not be a 
strong correlation between participant ability and stakes. 
Unfortunately, past practice in experimental research often had the experimenters 
selecting participants for games with particular stakes instead of allowing participants to 
opt in or out.  We know less than we should about how people decide whether to 
participate in low- or high-stakes games.  We can nonetheless make a few reasonably 
intelligent generalizations about low stakes behavior—many of them descriptive or 
positive, some tinged with normative recommendation. 
Substantial evidence indicates that low stakes decisions are associated with low 
levels of effort and more errors, which is defensible from a modern rationalist 
perspective.  Within social settings, many people will be more willing to settle their 
differences and to take risks and trust each other somewhat more often when the stakes 
are low.  And within dynamic settings that allow for selection in and out, it is possible 
that relatively less sophisticated and less resourceful people will stick to low stakes 
situations while others will migrate to higher stakes controversies. 
B.  Debates Over Interpretive Method 
What then might be said about ongoing debates over the proper method of 
constitutional interpretation for the courts?  It is possible, albeit tricky, to offer a few 
strong global recommendations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 I have been told by Albie Sachs that the South African Constitutional Court operated this way in 
its early years after the fall of Apartheid.  Apparently, judges on the Court worked collaboratively even 
when there was disagreement, understanding that the stakes surrounding foundational judgments were 
relatively high. 
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The first suggestion is that worry over judicial constraint should not fuel the 
debates.  One of the traditional motivations for vetting methods of interpretation for 
constitutional cases is the fear that the absence of method means the beginning of judicial 
dictatorship, or at least judicial usurpation of policy territory more appropriately assigned 
to other institutions.  If they will not sign onto a particular method, the argument runs, 
they will be free to dominate the rest of us in ways that we would rather avoid.  The 
problem for this argument is that judges are already seriously constrained before they 
begin to think about interpretive method, and those who do adopt something recognizable 
as interpretive method are not demonstrably constrained to the extent envisioned by the 
proponents of such constraints.  Even if every judge determined to “do justice as I see fit” 
unbridled by a coherent interpretive method, the judiciary would remain constrained by 
internal and external forces—beginning with the appointments process and ending with 
feasibility limits on courts’ ability to influence social, economic, and political systems of 
which they are one small part.  Again, this is not to say that judges can decide cases 
without an interpretive method, however implicit or parsimonious.  It is to say that worry 
about judicial constraint need not greatly increase the urgency of judges choosing sides.59 
A related recommendation is that the temperature of these debates ought to be 
turned down, perhaps to absolute zero.  If the relevant stakes involve court decisions in 
constitutional cases, and if important constitutional cases are not importantly influenced 
by interpretive method, then those interested in societal well-being probably should want 
resources devoted to more pressing matters.  Strenuous and costly investigations should 
be avoided if the outcome cannot make much difference.  Participants in the field of 
constitutional interpretive method might then relax, enjoy each other’s company, consider 
a compromise, and experiment with creative or even arguably outrageous solutions to 
methodological questions.  Indeed, many potential participants should stay out of the 
field or exit if they are currently laboring in it, taking into consideration their other 
options, of course. 
True, if potential participants think or act this way, the quality of work on 
interpretive method will be shoddier and less disciplined by the efforts of the most 
capable minds.  We might not see another work on the order of Ely’s Democracy and 
Distrust or Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, or with the brevity and insight of 
Dahl’s Decision-Making in a Democracy or Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial 
Process.  Whichever past works should be on the list of foundational contributions, they 
might well be adequate to our needs for the foreseeable future.  Perhaps the field of 
constitutional interpretation has already suffered from a diversion of high-quality mental 
and other resources to other projects.  (I will not say that my work in the field proves 
otherwise.)  Whether it has begun already or not, some diversion seems sensible. 
In fact, a series of affiliated subjects might rightly attract a refugee from the field.  
First of all, there is the question of best methods for constitutional decision making, 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 An even worse version of the constraint argument is that the need for constraint indicates that 
judges ought to adopt a particular interpretive method, such as some version of originalism.  Every method 
of interpretation and decision making presents constraints.  A need for judicial constraint is not an 
especially productive way of choosing among methods.  See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND 
LEGAL THEORY 156 n.31 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that judges could objectively constrain themselves by 
flipping coins). 
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which is often broader than the determination of interpretive method, along with the even 
more inclusive question about proper methods of judicial decision making full stop.  
Judicial decisions regarding sub-supreme law could be where the real action is, where 
judges have significant day-to-day impact despite the theoretical possibilities of 
legislative response.  On the same track are questions regarding models of judicial 
behavior.  Whether descriptively or normatively, the general goals and functions of courts 
in our society and over time could be better specified and explained.  For instance, 
appointed judges obviously serve a politically countercyclical function on certain 
occasions and for certain issues.  Many of us believe that this function is usually modest 
and more likely when other political forces are not fully united, but we might better 
understand precisely when and within which policy domains it is most likely to occur.  
Investigators are still pinpointing forces internal and external to legal institutions that 
produce law’s character.  With respect to the recent past, we already can do better than 
refer to “the hidden voices of the zeitgeist,”60 but there is considerable room for progress. 
These are broad suggestions and they are quite crude.  More detail is needed to go 
further in normative or positive directions, because understanding the implications of 
stake size requires understanding the details of a particular decision situation or debate.  
The specific situation will affect whether and which participants perceive the stakes as 
low or high, whether and which participants are sensitive to stake size, and whether and 
which participants have reason to change their practices.  One needs to know what kind 
of game (if any) participants believe that they are playing.  When it comes to the method 
of constitutional interpretation by judges, there are a variety of discussions taking place.  
In the closing paragraphs, I will simplify matters and present a few comments on 
academics, politicians, and judges who might engage in these discussions. 
(1) Academics as low stakes specialists.  The foregoing might indicate that 
scholars ought to exit the field en masse.  Indeed there is a valid concern about 
overexertion here.  For instance, and in my opinion, a troubling conceptual turn has 
occurred in one part of the debate over constitutional interpretation by judges.  More than 
one academic has declared that interpretation just is one thing or another, and that those 
who fail to engage in the specified practice cannot claim to be interpreting anything.61  In 
its worst form, this line of analysis is a taunt playing on a rough public consensus that 
judges may “interpret” but not “make” law.  If someone could control the definition of 
interpretation, they might claim victory in the debates over proper judicial behavior.  But 
no real victory will be achieved in this way.  Different scholars define interpretation 
differently, the relevant concepts are sometimes complicated moving targets, and it is not 
yet evident that anyone has changed their position on how judges should interpret legal 
texts based on these conceptual arguments.  Esoteric academic debates of this character 
seem to be heading nowhere, and to proceed without cognizance of the limited potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 42 (2002) (describing 
influences on nineteenth century judges, which is particularly challenging). 
61 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 28, at 1823–24; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 3–4 
(2008) (looking for original public meaning), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244; Stanley Fish, 
Intention Is All there Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1112, 1114 (2008) (asserting that finding authorial intention is interpretation, but 
that the concept lacks guidance for how to ascertain it). 
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impact of any interpretive protocol in the judiciary.  At a minimum, concerned onlookers 
should hope that scholars who remain in the field will understand the realistic constraints 
on judicial outcomes when they devise and recommend interpretive methods for that 
institution.62 
Other events might be signs of sensitivity to low stakes among academics, 
however.  A notable development is Jack Balkin’s announcement that he is an 
originalist.63  More than one explanation for this development can be spun out, and I 
cannot speak authoritatively on the subject.  But one possible account of Balkin’s public 
conversion is that he understood that choosing an interpretive method for the Constitution 
is a matter of little significance.  Whether or not he was in a conciliatory, trusting, and 
generous state of mind at the time, his adoption of the originalist brand has had no 
perceptible influence on the results he would reach in particular cases.  Balkin has 
attempted to show that one can support judicially enforceable abortion rights after 
declaring allegiance to originalism writ large,64 that the New Deal regulatory and welfare 
state is consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning,65 and that contemporary civil 
rights legislation comports with the original meaning of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments.66  Indeed Balkin claims that his version of originalism is 
compatible with living constitutionalism, and at least one other scholar has suggested a 
kind of detente using the device of constitutional construction.67 
Balkin’s adoption of originalism illustrated the flexibility underneath the label, 
and for all we know he intended to push the originalist school toward indeterminacy and 
meaninglessness.  No one is able to exclude Balkin from the club.  If other self-
proclaimed originalists try to purge him for finding that the Constitution includes an 
abortion right or for some other result on a contested issue of supreme law, they risk 
losing their claim to a bona fide constitutional method in the first place.68  And if he stays 
on the list, membership might not even signal much about the ex ante commitments to 
particular results of those who select into the club.  A decision to argue in originalist 
terms does say something, perhaps about the acceptable rhetoric of constitutional debate 
in the twenty-first century United States; Balkin’s announcement might be taken as a 
concession on this score.  But the decision says less than it might insofar as originalists 
can be pro-choice or not, accepting of health insurance mandates or not, convinced that 
the regulation of private discrimination is constitutional or not.  Thus interpretive 
theorists in the academy may be criticized for overkill and, at the same time, there are 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Of course criticisms like this are not restricted to constitutional interpretation.  One might say 
that academics are habitually engaged in low stakes inquiries, at least the ones who follow their fancy and 
lack an implementation strategy for their ideas. 
63 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
64 See id. 
65 See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce 4–5 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553002. 
66 See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power 5–6 (2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558749. 
67 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 934 (2009).  There is no settled method for constitutional construction, nor agreement on which 
institutions should perform it. 
68 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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grounds for believing that their attention is changing at the margins. 
Before leaving this subtopic, however, I want to show support for a measure of 
academic preoccupation with constitutional interpretation.  Exploration of ideas by a 
group of scholars unmoved by the perceived stakes for the rest of society can be part of a 
healthy system.  A society dedicated to self-criticism and progress should preserve spaces 
for unrealistic dreaming.  Much of what makes judicial interpretation of the Constitution 
a low stakes matter involves feasibility constraints that one can imagine becoming 
weaker.  Academics have the luxury of considering such eventualities.  Indeed it might be 
useful to have such thinking taking place in advance of any constitutional crisis that could 
be solved through sensible and sophisticated interpretive techniques developed outside 
the halls of ordinary politics.  In addition, sometimes “more is more” despite the inability 
to fully achieve an objective.  An interpretive method might accomplish some good if 
some decision makers follow the method only some of the time. 
Finally, academia is arguably the best location for individuals to exert shockingly 
high levels of effort investigating creative solutions to problems considered unimportant 
by others.  This is true even apart from any soothing effect on the intellectual class (a 
low-minded if practical goal), and from any objective good that uninhibited intellectual 
inquiry can achieve (a high-minded if controversial goal).  There is additional social 
value from the exercise.  Following whim, a single academic can help solve low stakes 
problems faced repeatedly by many other people.  On this basis we can appreciate the 
treatise writer, who might catch a sneer from colleagues at prestigious law schools, as 
well as the implausible suggestions of half-cocked high theorists.  Consider recent claims 
that interpreters should ask what the text meant to “a fully informed public audience, 
knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world,”69 or 
that a dramatically more amateurish version of originalism can be justified as a politically 
correct substitute for randomization in certain closely contested cases.70  The 
outrageousness or relative insignificance of academic arguments is, I hope, not an 
effective condemnation.  In any event, a dedicated scholar might be making his or her 
best contribution by grappling with a question generally thought to have no immediate 
value to societal well-being. 
(2) Politicians appointing judges.  The positive and normative picture is quite 
different once we move away from the academy.  Outsiders do have difficulty measuring 
the seriousness with which politicians and associated interest groups take the question of 
interpretive method in constitutional cases.  But my impression is that particular results 
are much more important to these actors than the choice of interpretive method, 
especially when the method in question is the least bit abstract.  We can know little about 
the behind-the-scenes vetting process for judges within the executive branch, or the 
negotiations among senators, interest groups, and the White House.  The public debate 
over federal judicial nominees, however, often has little to do with confrontations over 
interpretive method.  Recent confirmation struggles included plenty of discussion about 
particular cases or lines of doctrine, the possibility of super precedents, and nominee 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
70 See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1354–64 
(2008). 
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character, background, and temperament.  Full scale sparring over living 
constitutionalism or some version of originalism is usually absent. 
This is not always true.  Many critics of the Warren Court (which seems to 
include the early Burger Court) packaged their objections under the heading “Original 
Intent,” and Attorney General Edwin Meese adopted that label as an organizing idea for 
evaluating the Court and nominees thereto.71  In addition, the confirmation process for 
Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court ultimately helped to generate some 
debate on interpretive method.  But even the Bork hearings were not dominated by 
anything as theoretical as proper methods of constitutional interpretation.  At least 
equally important were questions about particular decisions, particular issues, particular 
doctrines, as well as Bork’s ideology and temperament.72  Politicians, interest groups, and 
others wanted to know where Bork stood on key issues that many considered settled or 
that otherwise threatened one group or another.  To the extent that identification with an 
interpretive method can be translated into a nominee’s stance on such issues, because 
such method has already been affiliated with a particular set of results, method choices 
will attract some attention.  It is difficult to avoid the feeling that much of the debate over 
constitutional interpretation during our lifetime has been animated by the participants’ 
positions on Roe.  This is not, however, evidence that participants in the nomination and 
confirmation process care about interpretive method for reasons other than predictive 
power.  And more recent confirmation proceedings display even less care for a nominee’s 
supposed method of interpreting the Constitution.  To put it mildly, Sonia Sotomayor was 
not required to deliver an illuminating disquisition on the matter.73  Nor was Elena 
Kagan’s repeated statement, “It’s law all the way down,”74 especially informative. 
Which is understandable.  Appointing officials are not boxed into answering low 
stakes questions regarding interpretive method, and they have good reason to shift their 
attention elsewhere.  The nomination and confirmation of judges involve practical 
considerations regarding who should staff the judiciary.  These processes depend on 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 599, 603–13 (2004). 
72 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA 220–27, 347–51 (1989) (noting the salience of particular civil rights and privacy norms, along 
with a broader struggle over the Reagan administration’s legal agenda). 
73 See, e.g., Sotomayor Hearings: The Complete Transcript, Part 1, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2009 
(“[I]n every case that I render, I first decide what the law requires under the facts before me, and that what I 
do is explain to litigants why the law requires a result.”). 
74 She offered more than that, of course.  See, e.g., Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Hearing on the 
Elena Kagan Nomination, CQ CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, June 29, 2010 (“I think that judges are always 
constrained by the law.  . . . [S]ometimes the text speaks clearly and then they’re constrained by the text 
alone.  Where the text doesn’t speak clearly, they look to other sources of law.  They look to original intent, 
they look to continuing history and traditions.  They look to precedent and the principles embodied in those 
precedent.   But they’re always constrained by the law.  It’s law all the way down.”); id. (“[I]n general, 
judges should look to a variety of sources when they interpret the Constitution, and which take precedence 
in a particular case is really a kind of case-by-case thing.  . . . .  And I would look at this very practically 
and very pragmatically . . . .”); Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan Nomination, CQ 
CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, June 30, 2010 (“It’s not personal views.  It’s not moral views.  It’s not political 
views.  It’s law all the way down.”). 
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reliable information about the likely performance of potential judges, including whether a 
candidate might use the office so as to threaten the foremost interests of the officials 
involved and their constituencies.  Again, court decisions in general and constitutional 
judicial review in particular can affect the rest of social life, and their modern mainstream 
judgments usually are not openly repudiated by other officials.  Wild-eyed, corrupt, 
slothful, or even patsy judges could threaten the basic settlement on the magnitude of 
federal judicial power in the United States.  But by now it should be understandable when 
an official charged with vetting potential judges shows little interest in screening on 
interpretive method as a way to separate good and bad judges, except as a proxy for a 
likely pattern of results conventionally associated with that method.  Even then, 
nominating and appointing officials can reasonably believe that the most extreme results 
will not come to pass, and should have little faith that interpretive method on its own will 
help predict results not already identified as the product of the method.  These officials 
are not scholars and we should neither expect nor hope that they expend as much effort 
playing with the concepts and toying with the possibilities for interpretive methods. 
(3) Judges deciding cases.  In some ways, judicial dealings with interpretive 
method are more like the politics of the appointments process and less like a symposium 
of constitutional theorists.  For all that we can tell from judicial opinions, many judges 
skate by without stopping to make serious commitments to one interpretive method over 
another.  As I have said, at least an implicit interpretive method is necessary to decide 
cases in which a legal text is relevant; but this does not mean that judges must ponder let 
alone negotiate over the proper method.  Most of them seem to do no such thing.  In fact, 
because certain methods of constitutional interpretation are still associated with particular 
patterns of results in controversial policy areas, choosing among these interpretive 
options will almost invariably affiliate that judge with those particular commitments.  For 
many judges, this will show the observing public more ideological rigidity than they 
actually have or wish to display. 
There are notable exceptions.  Justice Scalia contributed to a fairly famous 
volume on statutory and constitutional interpretation,75 and he is no stranger to the lecture 
circuit.  Justice Breyer recently followed up with a short book76 and public appearances 
of his own.  But these two justices are among the outliers.  Nor does it seem unfair to 
observe that they are both former academics.  There is not a widespread expectation that 
each judge will stake out a comprehensive position on interpretive method, and the few 
judges who attempt to do so are outnumbered by their more casual colleagues.  For every 
Brennan there must be twenty O’Connors.  At least some of those twenty must believe 
that interpretive method is not especially outcome determinative in cases that matter to 
judges, and that the limited time in which they have to close live cases affecting the lives 
of real parties is better directed toward other tasks.  The irreducible obligations of a 
dispute-resolving job should produce sympathy for any failure on the part of sitting 
judges to treat the methodological questions surrounding legal interpretation with 
intellectual rigor. 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System:  The Role of the United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy 
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76 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005). 
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Now, the foregoing does risk miscalculating the true stakes involved for judges.  
Judges do face charges of lawlessness, especially when they play with supreme law.  If a 
method of analysis is not formally announced, and if the results produce intense 
opposition on the part of some, as many decisions will, then the displeased will challenge 
not only the results but also the legitimacy of the process.  People will question whether 
those judges are really doing law.  A fairly predictable pattern of results probably will not 
be adequate to eliminate these complaints; it has not done so in the past.  One might come 
to believe that adopting a (perhaps any) method of interpretation is a necessity for judges, 
whether or not they believe that their decisions will be dictated by that choice. 
My final observation is to return to the starting point, which is mainstream 
politics.  Judges, even judges appointed for life, are members of the government and a 
political regime.  They are a product of that system.  And so in many situations, judges 
can effectively trust that system to have placed them in a position where they are unlikely 
to fail.  In other words, the fact of sitting on the bench is an indication that the gavel will 
be wielded in politically acceptable ways.  If there was not much clamor for dedications 
to interpretive method during the appointments process, there is some basis for believing 
that post-judgment complaints of lawlessness are more about the judgment than the 
method.  All of this is obviously too simplistic.  Often there are long temporal gaps 
between appointment and controversy, and judicial stature is threatened by a perception 
of arbitrariness.  But if the best of our efforts to understand the constrained judicial role 
in society are close to correct, then the true threats lie elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
Low stakes decisions might not be worth much of our time, but determining 
which decisions are in fact low stakes can be worth significant effort.  My sense is that 
this is the case for constitutional judicial review.  It probably is worth investigating and 
reinvestigating the influence of judiciaries (if any) on the rest of social life when they 
wield supreme law, along with the influence of announced interpretive method (if any) on 
those judicial decisions.  If these influences are normally modest, as much good work on 
the subject indicates, then we can look to other resources for guidance on how debates 
surrounding constitutional judicial review might and should proceed.  Given that the 
analysis in Part II was rather brief, I must acknowledge the real possibility of error 
regarding the implications of low stakes for debates over interpretive method.  But this is 
an extended essay, not an article.  And when it comes to the question how best to debate 
interpretive method, perhaps we do not have much to lose. 
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